

and early fifth centuries that its function continues to be a mystery and the subject of much debate. Hence the importance of this manuscript account, for it reveals that the Athenian *demos* was *not* charged initially with conducting ostracism. Rather, Kleisthenes' intention apparently was that ostracism be the prerogative of the Council—the Council of Five Hundred, if my suggestions are correct. We thus may find here evidence of this Council's strength at the time of its creation: the argument of those who envisage a powerful Kleisthenic *boule* will gain new support.

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HESIODIC ΦΡΟΝΗΣΙΣ

When preparing the OCT edition of the *Opera et Dies*,¹ I did not find it easy to depart from the generally accepted, much-quoted, and widely familiar text of v. 293: οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος δς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσει. However, the *recensio* definitely favored αὐτῷ rather than αὐτός; a better illustration of a *lectio difficilior* holding its ground against the *facilior* was hard to imagine; and after all αὐτῷ νοήσει makes sense provided αὐτῷ is understood as reflexive (= εαυτῷ) and suggests someone thinking, grasping, realizing everything “for himself,” i.e., with reference to his own interests. Surely, for the man who in v. 295 is recommended as second best (ἐσθλὸς δ' αὖ κάκεινος δς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται), someone who realizes everything “himself” would provide a stylistically more elegant and logically more satisfactory contrast than someone who realizes everything “for himself” and his interests. This explains why αὐτός made its way into the text and why in v. 296, where the two kinds of men stand side by side (δς δέ κε μήτ' αὐτῷ νόηῃ μήτ' ἄλλου ἀκούων . . .), the reading αὐτός has made additional conquests, including one of the important manuscripts (D), a papyrus of the first or second century (Π 33 = *PMich.* 5138, which in v. 293 has αὐτός only *pc*), and some authors of the imperial age.² For Hesiod himself, stylistic and logical considerations carry little weight. Once more, the question *ultrum in ultrum abire potuit* admits of only one answer.³

I should have hesitated even less if I had at the time remembered a passage in Aristotle's discussion of φρόνησις (*EN* 6. 8. 1141b33 f.): εἶδος μὲν οὖν τι ἂν εἴη γνώσεως τὸ αὐτῷ εἰδέναι. It matters little that the statement appears at the end of a disquisition in which Aristotle has set forth his views about φρόνησις; for, although these are controversial and he has to reject misunderstandings, the concept of

1. Hesiodi “*Theogonia*,” “*Opera et Dies*,” “*Scutum*” edidit Friedrich Solmsen; “*Fragmenta selecta*” ediderunt R. Merkelbach et M. L. West (Oxford, 1971). Fuller information about *testimonia* may be found in the edition of *Opera et Dies* by A. Colonna (Milan, 1959) and in the *editio maior* of A. Rzach (Leipzig, 1902), whose account of the MSS is rather too full by present-day standards.

2. For a very different assessment of the two readings, see Wilamowitz, *Hesiodos “Erga”* (Berlin, 1928; repr. 1962), ad loc. Like him I do not consider v. 294 as authentic, but I fail to see why αὐτῷ should have originated in connection with this line and why this difficult reading should have spread from there to other lines.

3. M. L. West in his recent paper (*CQ* 24 [1974]: 161 ff.) infers the presence of αὐτός in v. 293 for a manuscript “not later than the tenth century” (p. 163) which was used by the *Etymologica*. I gather that in the newly constituted “ψ family” (pp. 168 ff.) αὐτῷ prevails. The family is close to D. That ψ₁₂, the only manuscript cited for αὐτός, has this reading also in v. 296 (p. 172) conforms to the pattern.

prudence or practical intelligence had its established place in Greek thought.⁴ Its definition as *αὐτῷ εἰδέναι* is not likely to have offended linguistic sensibilities. Elsewhere in the same context the *φρόνιμος* is described as *περὶ αὐτὸν εἰδώς* (1142a1; cf. 1141a25) or said to know *περὶ τὰ ὠφέλιμα, ἀγαθὰ, συμφέροντα* (with the dative of the reflexive pronoun 1140a25 f., 1140b7 ff., 1141a29 f., 1141b6 ff.). That Hesiod too has practical advantage in mind may be regarded as certain.

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4. Cf. W. Jaeger, *Aristoteles* (Berlin, 1923), pp. 82 ff., esp. 84, n. 1 (= *Aristotle*², trans. R. Robinson [Oxford, 1948], pp. 81 ff., esp. 82, n. 1), where for the *φρόνησις* of *EN* close contact with the general usage is emphasized. Jaeger's opinion about the meanings of *φρόνησις* has not gone unchallenged. Whether the objections touch the core of his insights need not here be discussed (see, for the *status quaestionis*, the scrutiny of C. J. Rowe in *Untersuchungen zur Eudem. Ethik* = *Akten des 5. Symposium Aristotelicum*, edited by P. Moraux and D. Harlfinger [Berlin, 1971], pp. 73 ff.); what matters is that they do not touch the meaning of passages relevant to our argument.

BUT LIVY SAID *SED*

. . . legati ab Cotye rege Thracum venerunt, pecuniam ad redimendum filium aliosque obsides apportantes. eis in senatum introductis, et id ipsum argumenti praetendentibus orationi, non sua voluntate Cotyn bello iuvisse Persea, quod obsides dare coactus esset, orantibusque, ut eos pretio; quantum ipsi statuissent patres, redimi paterentur eqs.

[Livy 45. 42. 6–7]

The Loeb editor, A. C. Schlesinger, renders the words *non sua voluntate . . . coactus esset* thus: “. . . saying that Cotys had not voluntarily aided Perseus in the war, because he had been compelled to give hostages . . .” A correct translation of the Latin as it stands, and one which makes sense in context. Those who are, on these grounds, not disposed to entertain the possibility that the Latin may be corrupt need read no further. In my judgment, however, the Latin of the MSS is not quite what Livy wrote.

The contrast between free choice and coercion is a favorite one with Livy: *volentes ac non coacti* (24. 37. 7); *volentem, non vi coactam* (34. 31. 10). If I mistake not, Livy regularly makes this contrast a *coordinate* one (that is, a true contrast). Compare, in addition to the passages just adduced, 8. 23. 1, 21. 39. 5, 29. 3. 11, 30. 33. 6, 31. 33. 5, 31. 41. 2, 38. 9. 10, 39. 25. 5, 45. 12. 2. In our passage, however, the clause containing the concept of coercion (*quod . . . coactus esset*) is *subordinated* to the concept of free choice (*sua voluntate*). The transmitted words, therefore, do not accord with Livy's normal (and well-attested) practice elsewhere; they are suspicious on grounds of style. The slightest of transcriptional changes will remove all offense: “. . . non sua voluntate Cotyn bello iuvisse Persea, (sed) quod obsides dare coactus esset . . .”

How easy it would be for *SED* to drop out after *PerSEA* (and before *quOD*) is obvious. For a stylistic parallel see 5. 52. 12: “quid horum opus fuit suscipi . . . si *non voluntate* mansimus in Capitolio per tot menses obsidionis, *sed* ab hostibus metu retenti sumus?” In the latter passage *sed* is the reading of the fourth-century